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Stable matching in a community consisting of N men and N women is a classical combinatorial problem that
has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal
paper by Gale and Shapley.
In this paper, we study the number of stable pairs, that is, the man/woman pairs that appear in some stable
matching. We prove that if the preference lists on one side are generated at random using the popularity
model of Immorlica and Mahdian, the expected number of stable edges is bounded by N lnN + N , matching
the asymptotic value for uniform preference lists. If in addition that popularity model is a geometric distri-
bution, then the number of stable edges is O(N ) and the incentive to manipulate is limited. If in addition
the preference lists on the other side are uniform, then the number of stable edges is asymptotically N up to
lower order terms: most participants have a unique stable partner, hence non-manipulability.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the classical stable matching problem, a certain community consists ofN men andN women, all
heterosexual andmonogamous, and each person ranks those of the opposite sex in accordancewith
his or her preferences for a marriage partner. Our objective is to marry off all members of the com-
munity in such a way that the established matching is stable, i.e. such that there is no blocking pair :
a man and a woman who are not married to each other but prefer each other to their actual mates.
In their seminal paper, Gale and Shapley [10] prove that there always exists a stable matching
and give an algorithm for the problem. Their original motivation was the assignment of students to
colleges, a setting to which the algorithm and results extend, and their approach was successfully
implemented in many matching markets; see for example [1, 2, 5, 29].
However, there exist instances with more than one stable matching, and even extreme cases
of instances in which every man/woman pair belongs to some stable matching. This raises the
question of which matching to choose [12] and of possible strategic behavior (see paragraph on
manipulability below).
Fortunately, there is empirical evidence showing that in many instances, in practice the stable
matching is essentially unique (phenomenon often referred as “core-convergence”); see for ex-
ample [4, 14, 23, 29]. One of the empirical justifications of core-convergence given by Roth and
Peranson in [29] is that the preference lists are correlated: “One factor that strongly influences the
size of the set of stable matchings is the correlation of preferences among programs and among ap-
plicants. When preferences are highly correlated (i.e., when similar programs tend to agree which are
the most desirable applicants, and applicants tend to agree which are the most desirable programs),
the set of stable matchings is small.”
Following that direction of enquiry, we argue that “core convergence” is best captured by the
total number of man/woman pairs that belong to some stable matching, and wemodel correlations
by sampling preference lists using the popularity model of Immorlica and Mahdian [15].
We prove that if the preference lists on one side are sampled using popularities, the expected
number of stable edges is bounded by N lnN + N , matching the asymptotic value for uniform
preference lists [25]. If in addition that popularity model is a geometric distribution, then the
number of stable edges is O(N ) and the incentive tomanipulate is limited. Further, if in addition the
preference lists on the other side are uniform, then the number of stable edges is asymptotically N
up to lower order terms: most participants have a unique stable partner, hence non-manipulability.
This work was done in part while one of the authors was visiting the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing; and was
partially funded by the grant ANR-19-CE48-0016 from the French National Research Agency (ANR).
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1.1 Definitions and main theorems
Let N be a positive integer,M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mN } a set of N men andW = {w1,w2, . . . ,wN } a
set of N women. Each man has a total order over W and each woman has a total order over M,
representing their preferences for a marriage partner.
Definition 1 (Stability, from [10]). Given a perfect matching over M ∪W, a pair (m,w) not in
the matching is blocking if manm prefers womanw to his partner andw prefersm to her partner.
A perfect matching overM ∪W is stable if there is no blocking pair.
Definition 2. A pair is stable if it belongs to at least one stable matching. The stable graph is the
graph of all stable pairs.
Preference lists generated from popularities are an input model introduced by Immorlica and
Mahdian in [15] for preference lists of fixed lengths. In the present paper, the stochastic process is
used to generate full length preference lists.
Definition 3 (Popularity preferences). We say that a womanw has popularity preferences if there
exists a distribution1 D over the menM such that w builds a random preference list over M by
repeatedly sampling from D without replacement (renormalizing D at each step). Similarly, one
may define popularity preferences for a man.
The popularities ofm1,m2 andm3 are
respectively 2, 5 and 3; the probability
thatm2 ≻m1 ≻ m3 is:
5
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2
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3
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Fig. 1. Stochastic process used to generate a preference list from popularities.
Figure 1 illustrates the process of sampling a preference list over 3 menm1,m2 andm3 of popu-
larities 2, 5 and 3. Except when it is explicitly stated otherwise, we will assume that women have
i.i.d. popularity preferences. When the distribution D is uniform, the preference lists of women
are random independent uniform permutations.When the distribution is highly skewed, with high
probability the women all have the same preference list, thus the distribution induces correlations
between the preferences of different women.
Theorem 1. Assume that the men have arbitrary preferences and the women have i.i.d. popularity
preferences. Then the expected total number of stable pairs is at most N + N lnN .
Pittel [25] proved that in the case where men and women have uniform preferences, the ex-
pected total number of stable pairs is ∼ N lnN , hence Theorem 1 implies that the uniform case
asymptotically maximizes the number of stable pairs, up to lower order terms. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first theoretical result proving that having uncorrelated preferences is a
worst case situation for “core convergence”.
Definition4 (Geometric popularity preferences). We say that awomenw has geometric popularity
preferences if D is a geometric distribution: there exists 0 < λ < 1 such that D(mi ) = λ
i for all
1 ≤ i ≤ N .
The preference lists of the women are highly correlated when λ is small and become all identical
if λ tends to 0. The limit case is a well known instance where there is exactly one stable matching.
1actually we do not require that
∑
m∈M D(m) = 1, as we normalize each time a man is sampled.
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Theorem 2. Assume that the men have arbitrary preferences and the women have i.i.d. geometric
popularity preferences. Then the expected total number of stable pairs is O(N ). Moreover, a woman
using a non-truthful strategy can improve the rank of her partner in her true preference list by at most
a constant, with high probability.
Although the number of stable matchings may still be exponentially large, Theorem 2 implies
that most participants only have a constant number of stable partners on average. Theorem 2 can
be compared to a result from [21], where preferences are based on random utilities and Lee showed
that the gain of someone trying to manipulate is almost null for almost everyone.
Theorem 3. Assume that the men have uniform popularity preferences and the women have geomet-
ric popularity preferences. Then the expected total number of stable pairs is N + O(ln3 N ). Moreover,
a woman using a non-truthful strategy will not improve the rank of her partner in her true preference
list, with high probability.
Theorem 3 can be compared to results from [3, 15] where it is shown that the fraction of persons
with more than one stable partner is vanishingly small.
To summarize our results, we studied the number of stable pairs when adding correlations be-
tween the preference lists: starting from arbitrary preferences (that can be “negatively correlated”),
we considered uniformly random preferences (not correlated), popularity preferences (that are
“positively correlated”), geometric popularity preferences (preferences are all identical in the limit).
To go further, one might want to relax the assumption that all the woman have the same popu-
larity distribution over the men (because there might be several “types” of women). Extensions of
Theorems 1, 2 and 3 are respectively discussed in subsections 3.3, 4.5 and 5.3.
1.2 Techniques
Our results follow from a probabilistic analysis of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, using the principle
of deferred decisions. Algorithm 1, introduced in [10], finds the stable matching in which women
are matched to their worst stable partners. Algorithm 2, introduced in [19] as a variant of previous
algorithms, finds all stable partners of a given woman.
The core of the proof of Theorem 1 is Lemma 12, that bounds the number of stable partners of
a woman as a function of their popularities. In the proof of Theorem 2 we first argue that if two
men have very different popularities, then the less popular one will always have lower priority
than the more popular one, in every preference list. Then, men are effectively only in competition
with men who have popularities similar to their own. We therefore order the men by popularity,
define a corresponding ordering of women (see Definition 5), and line up men and women. We
can define blocks so that a person in a block can only be married to someone in the same block
(see Figure 2). In Theorem 3 we extend the analysis of Theorem 2, incorporating ideas from [3] to
prove that the stable graph is nearly a perfect matching.
1.3 Previous results
Stable matchings. Gale and Shapley [10] proved that stable matchings always exist and gave
an algorithm for finding one, the men proposing deferred acceptance procedure (see Algorithm 1),
which they prove is men-optimal: every man is at least as well off (in the sense of the rank of
his partner in his preference list) as he would be in any other stable matching. They also proved
that the men-optimal stable matching is also the women-pessimal stable matching. By symmetry,
there also exists a women-optimal/men-pessimal stable matching. Mc Vitie and Wilson, and then
Gusfield [11, 22] showed that this women-optimal matching can also be obtained through a se-
quence of “rejection chains” via an extension of the men proposing deferred acceptance algorithm
(see Algorithm 2, a simplified version from [19]). Those algorithms exploit the distributive lattice
structure of the set of stable matchings, an observation attributed to J.H. Conway in [17]. For more
information, see the books [6, 12, 18].
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Manipulability. There exists instances with more than one stable matching, and even extreme
cases of instances in which every man/woman pair belongs to some stable matching. This raises
the question ofwhichmatching to choose [11, 12] and of possible strategic behavior, when for some
participants, reporting a true preference list may not be a best response to reported preferences of
others [8, 28]. Demange, Gale and Sotomayor [7] proved the following. Assume awoman lies about
her preference list, falsifying her preferences strategically by changing her order of preferences
and truncating it (declaring some men unacceptable). This gives rise to a new stable matching, but
she will be no better off than she would be in the true woman-optimal matching. This implies that
a woman can only gain from strategic manipulation up to the maximum difference between their
best and worst partners in stable matchings. In particular, if a woman has the same partner in all
stable matchings (unique stable partner), then she cannot benefit frommanipulation. By symmetry,
this also implies that the men proposing deferred acceptance procedure is strategy-proof for men
(as they will get their best possible partner by telling the truth).
Stochastic preferences. In the worst case, there are instances where every man/woman pair be-
longs to some stable matching. Fortunately, there is empirical evidence showing that in many
instances, in practice the stable matching is essentially unique. Theoretical studies have tried to
understand the “core convergence” in one-to-one matching [3, 15, 19] and in the extension to
many-to-onematching [13, 20]. Analyzing instances that are less far-fetched than in theworst case
is the motivation underlying the model of stochastically generated preference lists. Researchers
have studied uniformly random preferences [3, 19, 24–27], preference generated with a popularity-
based model [15, 20], and preferences induced by random utilities [21]. To express the idea of “core
convergence” in real life markets, a number of parameters are of interest in the study of stable mar-
riage.
Counting the number of stable matchings. Since the question was first posed by Knuth [17], the
maximum (over all instances) number of stable matchings has been the object of much study,
including recent work by Karlin, Gharan and Weber [16], proving an exponential upper-bound.
The best known lower bound is approximately 2.28N in [30]. However, note that a single pair may
belong to many stable matchings. Therefore one may ask about the number of stable pairs.
Counting the number of stable pairs. A stable pair is a man/woman pair which belongs to at
least one stable matching. When the stable matching is unique, there are exactly N stable pairs.
But in general the number of stable pairs is a very different measure from the number of stable
matchings. In the case of uniform preferences, there are Θ(N logN ) stable pairs on average [19],
yet the number of stable matchings is also very low, just Θ(N logN ) [24]. In the case where all
preferences are almost aligned (for example when menm2i andm2i+1 always precedesm2i+2 and
m2i+3), there are onlyO(N ) stable pairs, yet the number of stable matchings might be exponential
in N : the number of stable matchings is not a good measure of the complexity of the instance in
this case.
Counting the number of persons with k stable partners. Instead of the total number of stable
pairs, one may refine the analysis and study the distribution of the number of stable partners of a
given participant. This was done in full detail by Pittel, Shepp and Veklerov in the case of uniform
preferences [27]. The number of persons with exactly one stable partner has also been studied in
[15] for constant size preference lists, and in [3, 26] for unbalanced markets.
Other measures. Given a stable matching, one may also study the average over the men of the
rank of the man’s partner in his preference list. One measure of the complexity of the instance is
the ratio/difference between that value for the men-optimal and for the men-pessimal matchings.
In the case of uniform preferences, that ratio is about Θ(N /log2 N ) [24]. In the case of N men and
N + 1 women, this ratio falls to 1 + o(1) for both men and women [3, 26]. Note that this measure
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is also related to the number of stables pairs: the difference in rank between someone’s best and
worst partner is an upper bound on their number of stable partners. Finally, a last measure uses
a model where each person receives some “utility” from a given matching. Each person wants to
maximize the utility they receives, thus it induces preference lists. This model was studied with
randomly sampled utilities in [21] where Lee showed that almost everyone receives almost the
same utility from every stable matching. When those measures are small, that has implications on
manipulability, not because the number of stable partners is small, but because the incentive for
someone to lie is relatively small.
2 BACKGROUND: STABLE MATCHINGS WITH RANDOM PREFERENCES
We start this section by giving formal notations for the stable matching problem, then we recall
classical structural results and algorithms on the lattice of stable matchings. Finally we discuss the
stochastic process used to generate random preferences.
2.1 Stable matchings
In terms of notations, we view a matching as a function µ : M ∪W → M ∪W, which is an
involution (µ2 = Id), where each man is paired with a woman (µ(M) ⊆ W), and where each
woman is paired with a man (µ(W) ⊆ M). We denote by ≻m the total order of manm over W
(w ≻m w
′ means thatm prefersw to w ′), similarly ≻w for the total order of womanw overM.
Algorithm 1Men Proposing Deferred Acceptance.
Input: Preferences of men (≻m)m∈M and women (≻w )w ∈W .
Initialization : Start with an empty matching. ⊲ define µ ← idM∪W
While there is a manm who is single, do ⊲ while ∃m ∈ M, µ(m) =m
m proposes to his favorite womanw he has not proposed to yet. ⊲ in the total order ≻m
If m isw ’s favorite man among all proposals she received, ⊲ if µ(w) = w orm ≻w µ(w)
w acceptsm’s proposal, and rejects her previous husband if she was married.
⊲ execute µ(µ(w)) ← µ(w) ; µ(m) ← w ; µ(w) ←m
Output: Resulting matching. ⊲ return µ⊥ ← µ
Algorithm 2 Extended Men Proposing Deferred Acceptance.
Input: Preferences of men (≻m)m∈M and women (≻w )w ∈W . Fixed womanw
∗ ∈ W.
Initialization : Start by executing Algorithm 1, then break (virtually) the pair betweenw∗ and
her husbandm, who becomes the proposer.
⊲ compute matching µ ← µ⊥, then definem ← µ(w
∗) and S ← {m}
While the proposer m has not proposed to every woman, do
At this point, manm and womanw∗ are (virtually) single, and everyone else is paired.
m proposes to his favorite womanw he has not proposed to yet. ⊲ in the total order ≻m
If m isw ’s favorite man among all proposals she received, ⊲ ifm ≻w µ(w)
If w = w∗, then w∗ acceptsm’s proposal,m is a new stable husband of w∗, then break
(virtually) the pair betweenw∗ andm, who stays the proposer.
⊲ if w = w∗, then execute µ(m) ← w ; µ(w) ←m, S ← {m} ∪ S
Elsew rejects her previous husbandm′, acceptsm’s proposal, the proposer becomesm′.
⊲ otherwise executem′ ← µ(w), µ(m) ← w ; µ(w) ←m,m ←m′
Output: Set of stable husbands ofw∗. ⊲ return S
See Appendix A for a detailed execution of Algorithms 1 and 2.
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Lemma 4 (Adapted from [10]). Algorithm 1 outputs a stable matching µ⊥ in which every man (resp.
woman) has his best (resp. her worst) stable partner.
Lemma 5 (Adapted from [19]). Given a womanw∗, Algorithm 2 enumerates all the stable husbands
ofw∗ (that is, her partners in all stable matchings).
The following is a corollary of Lemma 4 obtained by reversing the roles of men and women.
Lemma 6. If for each womanw we denote by µ⊤(w) her favorite stable husband, then µ⊤ is a stable
matching in which every man has his worst stable partner.
2.2 Popularity preferences
The popularity based stochastic process we use to generate ordered preference lists has previously
been defined and studied in [15, 20]. In this model each person has a positive popularity, and in a
preference list, a person of popularity p1 has a probability p1/(p1+p2) to be ranked before a person
of popularity p2.
More precisely, each manm ∈ M has a popularity D(m) ∈ R∗
+
. A woman w ∈ W builds her
preference list, a total order ≻w , by sampling without replacement fromM using the (normalized)
distribution D (she samples her first choice, then her second, . . . ). We note DN the induced distri-
bution over preference lists. This sampling method is also known asweighted random sampling [9].
Lemma 7. Among a set of men S ⊆ M, the probability that a manm isw ’s favorite is D(m)∑
s∈S D(s)
.
∀S ⊆ M, ∀m ∈ S \ {m}, P[∀s ∈ S,m ≻w s] =
D(m)∑
s ∈M D(s)
Proof. During the sampling of ≻w consider the first time when a man in S is chosen. The
probability that that man ism, given that it is a man of S that is chosen, equals the above quantity.

Lemma 8. The preferences of womanw can be computed “online”: during the execution of Algorithms
1 and 2, the only questions about w ’s preferences are of the form: “is m the best man among all
proposals received by w so far?”, and w ’s answer to that question is independent of her answers to
previous questions.
Proof sketch. Consider a situation where we know menm1 andm2 proposed to a woman w
and that womanw prefersm2 tom1. The probability that a proposal frommanm3 will be accepted
(that is,m3 is better thatm2 andm1) given thatw prefersm2 tom1 is P[m3 ≻w m2,m1 |m2 ≻w m1]
which can be computed as:
P[m3 ≻w m2 ≻w m1]
P[m2 ≻w m1]
=
P[m3 ≻w m2,m1] · P[m2 ≻w m1]
P[m2 ≻w m1]
= P[m3 ≻w m2,m1].
Thus (m3 ≻w m2,m1) and (m2 ≻w m1) are independent. The same proof works in general. 
Remark 9. Most of our proofs in sections 3, 4 and 5 will use the principle of deferred decisions (see
[19]) and are based on a stochastic analysis of Algorithm 2. We condition on the “initial” matching
µ⊥, obtained at the end of Algorithm 1. Indeed, one can notice that knowing µ⊥ and the preference
lists of the men, one can deduce, for each woman, the proposals received so far (each man proposed
to everyone on his preference list up to his current wife) and her favorite man among among those
(namely, her current husband). Using Lemmas 7 and 8, this (partial) knowledge about the execution
of Algorithm 1 suffices to continue the execution of Algorithm 2, with women answering questions
online.
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3 DEFERRED ACCEPTANCE: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section we prove an upper bound on the number of stable pairs through the analysis of
the men proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. In previous work [15], Immorlica and Mahdian
studied a setting where women have complete arbitrary preferences and men have truncated pop-
ularity preferences. In our analysis, women have complete popularity preferences and men have
(truncated) arbitrary preferences. The main difference is that in [15], the proposals are sampled
online, with deterministic answers. Here the randomness is moved to the answering part, with
deterministic proposals.
3.1 One woman has popularity preferences
In this subsection, we are given a womanw∗. The preference lists of all other participants are given
and arbitrary. Woman w∗ has popularity preferences, and her preferences are sampled “online”
during the execution of Algorithms 1 and 2, according to Lemmas 7 and 8.
Let us detail a possible real life execution of Algorithm 1: some day, w∗ receives a proposal
from manm1 and accepts because she is single. Later she receives a proposal from manm2. With
probability D(m1)/(D(m1) + D(m2)), she prefers m1 to m2, and then she rejects the proposal
from m2 and stays with m1. Later still, she receives a proposal from man m3. With probability
D(m3)/(D(m1)+D(m2)+D(m3)), she prefersm3 to bothm1 andm2, and then she acceptsm3 and
rejects her previous husbandm1. Note that knowing which is her preferred husband betweenm1
andm2 is irrelevant to computing the probability of her answer tom3.
Lemma 10. Let µ⊥ denote the matching obtained at the end of Algorithm 1 and p⊥ denote the sum
of popularities of proposals received by w∗ during Algorithm 1, including µ⊥(w
∗). Conditioning on
µ⊥ and on the preferences of other participants, the sequence x1, x2, . . . , xK of proposals received by
w∗ during the rest of the execution of Algorithm 2 is completely determined and independent ofw∗’s
preferences, and her answers to the proposals are independent from one another. Let pi = D(xi ) for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ K . Then:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, P[proposal xi is accepted by w
∗ | µ⊥] =
pi
p⊥ + p1 + · · · + pi
Proof. As the preferences of everyone except w∗ are deterministic, recall from Remark 9 that
conditioning on the value of µ⊥, we know everything needed for the rest of the execution of
Algorithm 2. The only source of randomness during the execution of Algorithm 2 comes from the
answers of w∗ to the proposals she receives, and the only impact of her accepting of refusing a
proposal is to add or not the proposer to the set of stable husbands of w∗. 
Lemma 11. Let µ⊥ denote the matching obtained at the end of Algorithm 1 and µ⊤(w
∗) denote the
last man accepted by w∗ during the execution of Algorithm 2 (her favorite stable husband). Let K be
the number of proposals received byw∗ in Algorithm 2. Then:
E[Nb of stable husbands ofw∗ | µ⊥] ≤ 1+E[ln(K+1) | µ⊥]+E [ln(D(µ⊤(w
∗))) | µ⊥]− ln(D(µ⊥(w
∗)))
Proof. The main ingredient is a sum/integral comparison.
K∑
i=1
pi
p⊥ + p1 + · · · + pi
≤
K∑
i=1
∫ p⊥+p1+· · ·+pi
p⊥+p1+· · ·+pi−1
dt
t
= ln(p⊥ + p1 + · · · + pK ) − lnp⊥
See Appendix B for the full proof. 
Taking the inequality of Lemma 11 and averaging over µ⊥ immediately yields Lemma 12.
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Lemma 12. Let µ⊥ be the men optimal matching and µ⊤ the women optimal matching (µ⊥ and µ⊤
are random variables). Let Kw ∗ be the number of men who rankw
∗. Then:
E[Number of stable husbands ofw∗] ≤ 1 + lnKw ∗ + E
[
ln
D(µ⊤(w
∗))
D(µ⊥(w∗))
]
3.2 All women have i.i.d. popularity preferences
In this subsection, all women have popularity preferences, and sample independently their lists
using the same distribution D :M → R∗
+
.
Theorem 1. Assume that the men have arbitrary preferences and the women have i.i.d. popularity
preferences. Then the expected total number of stable pairs is at most N + N lnN .
Proof. All preferences lists (≻w )w ∈W being independent given the popularities, Lemma 12 is
valid for each womanw ∈ W. Indeed, the case where all the other women have popularity prefer-
ences is actually a linear combination of cases where those women have deterministic preferences.
Thus we write Y =
∑
w ∈W Yw , with Y the total number of stable pairs and Yw the number of stable
husbands ofw . We can use Lemma 12 and linearity of expectation to obtain:
E[Y ] =
∑
w ∈W
E[Yw ] ≤ N + N lnN + E
[ ∑
w ∈W
ln(D(µ⊤(w))) −
∑
w ∈W
ln(D(µ⊥(w)))
]
Since µ⊥ and µ⊤ are both perfect matchings, in the expectation the two sums cancel each other,
because they both are equal to
∑
m∈M ln(D(m)). 
Remark 13. When men have arbitrary preference lists of length K , Theorem 1 gives an upper bound
of N +N lnK on the expected number of stable pairs: let Kw be the number of men who rank woman
w , by concavity of the logarithm, and using the fact that
∑
w ∈W Kw = K ·N , we have
∑
w ∈W lnKw ≤
N lnK .
3.3 Women have independent but non-identical popularity preferences
When women have i.i.d. popularity preferences, each man has ex-ante the same value in the eyes
of every woman. One might want to relax this property, by allowing the distribution D to vary
from one woman to another.
Theorem14. Assume that the men have arbitrary preferences lists and the women have independent
popularity preferences: each woman has her own distributionDw . For each manm, let us defineCm =
maxw∈W Dw (m)
minw∈W Dw (m)
. Then the expected total number of stable pairs is at most N + N lnN +
∑
m∈M lnCm .
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 1, we bound the last two terms: for any µ⊥ and µ⊤ we have∑
w ∈W
(
ln(D(µ⊤(w))) − ln(D(µ⊥(w)))
)
≤
∑
m∈M
(
max
w ∈W
Dw (m) − min
w ∈W
Dw (m)
)
≤
∑
m∈M
lnCm

As long as the ratiosCm are polynomial in N , the expected number of stable pairs isO(N lnN ).
4 INSTANCE DECOMPOSITION: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In this section, we view the set of stable matchings as the cartesian product of the stable match-
ings of connected components of the stable graph. An instance of stable matching can thus be
“decomposed” into several smaller sub-instances.
In this section the men have arbitrary preferences and the women have i.i.d. geometric popu-
larity preferences: there exists λ such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N we have D(mi ) = λ
i with 0 < λ < 1.
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We now recall Theorem 2. We prove in Theorem 22 that the number of stable pairs is linear; and
in Theorem 23 that the difference of rank between a woman best and worst stable husband is
constant.
Theorem 2. Assume that the men have arbitrary preferences and the women have i.i.d. geometric
popularity preferences. Then the expected total number of stable pairs is O(N ). Moreover, a woman
using a non-truthful strategy can improve the rank of her partner in her true preference list by at most
a constant, with high probability.
4.1 Decomposition into blocks
Recall that µ⊥ denotes the matching computed by Algorithm 1. Up to relabeling the women, we
may assume that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N wehavewi = µ⊥(mi ).We now define separators: one separator at
t = 0, and one separator for every t ∈ [1,N ] such that every womanw1, . . . ,wt prefers her husband
in µ⊥ to every manmt+1, . . . ,mN . This defines a sequence of separators 0 = x0, x1, x2, . . . , xb = N .
If xi = t
′ and xi+1 = t denote two consecutive separators, then we define a block as the set of men
and women {mt ′+1,mt ′+2, . . . ,mt ,wt ′+1,wt ′+2, . . . ,wt }.
Women
Men
m1 m2 m3 . . . . . . . . . mn
w1 w2 w3 . . . . . . . . . wn
x0 x1 x2 xb
Fig. 2. Example of the decomposition of the stable graph into blocks using separators. The men are ordered
by decreasing popularities, and µ⊥ is the vertical matching.
Lemma 15. If manmj and woman wi are stable partners then wi andmj belong to the same block.
Proof. Let t be a separator. First consider a womanwi such that i ≤ t . Consider executing Al-
gorithm 2 to find the stable partners ofwi . By definition of separators,wi prefersmi (and therefore
also her subsequent stable husbands) to all menmt+1, . . . ,mN , so she will never accept any pro-
posal from any man among those, so (wi ,mj ) is not stable for any j > t . Let µ be a stable matching.
We have µ(mi ) ∈ {m1,m2, . . .mt } for all i ≤ t . Since the two sets have equal cardinality, we must
therefore have µ({w1,w2, . . . ,wt }) = {m1,m2, . . .mt }.
Let t ′ < t be the previous separator. We must also have µ({w1,w2, . . . ,wt ′}) = {m1,m2, . . .mt ′}.
Therefore, µ({wt ′+1,wt ′+2, . . . ,wt }) = {mt ′+1,mt ′+2, . . .mt }: in other words, µ matches inside the
block. Since that is true for every stable matching µ , all stable edges are internal to blocks. 
Thanks to Lemma 15, we can state that the total number of stable pairs is at most the sum of
the squares of the block sizes,
∑b
i=1(xi −xi−1)
2, so it only remains to analyze the distribution of the
block sizes.
Remark 16. Stable matchings with N − 1 man and N woman having uniform preference lists have
been studied by Ashlagi, Kanoria and Leshno [3], then by Pittel [26]. One can notice that unbalanced
markets are easy to simulate with popularity preferences. Imagine a manm having a popularity ε so
small that with high probability every woman will rankm last (for example a gap of 1/N 4 is enough).
The woman married tom in µ⊥ has only one stable partner, and she can in fact be considered as single.
This is caused by a separator being placed between the first N −1men and the last (least popular) one.
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4.2 Stochastic analysis of the size of the first block
In this subsection, we condition probabilities on the value of the matching µ⊥ obtained at the end
of Algorithm 1. In this subsection we focus on the distribution of the size of the first block, x1;
later we will argue that the analysis is also valid for the size (xi − xi−1) of any block 1 ≤ i ≤ b. To
study x1, we view the construction of the first separator as a Markov process, and use stochastic
domination to derive upper bounds.
Lemma 17. Let t ∈ [1,N ]. With probability at least exp
(
− λ
∆+1
(1−λ)2
)
, for every j ≤ t and every i > t+∆,
woman w j prefersmj tomi .
Proof. Given j ∈ [1, t], by definition of µ⊥, womanw j prefersmj to all the men who proposed
to her during the execution of Algorithm 1. Using Lemmas 7 and 8, the probability thatw j prefers
mj to all the other contenders in {mi }t+∆<i≤n is at least
λj
λj +
∑
t+∆<i≤n λ
i
≥
1
1 + λ
∆+1+t−j
1−λ
≥ exp
(
−
λ∆+1+t−j
1 − λ
)
.
By independence, the probability that this holds for every j ∈ [1, t] is at least∏
1≤j≤t
exp
(
−
λ∆+1+t−j
1 − λ
)
= exp
(
−
λ∆+1
1 − λ
∑
1≤j≤t
λt−j
)
≥ exp
(
−
λ∆+1
(1 − λ)2
)
.

In particular, Lemma 17 for∆ = 0means that t is a separatorwith probability at least exp(− λ
(1−λ)2
).
However, because of correlations, we cannot infer anything useful about the expectation of x1 (and
even less about the expectation of x21 ), so a more refined analysis is necessary.
Given µ⊥, we view the separators as being constructed in an online manner; we proceed by
order of increasing i and reveal the entire preference list ofwi by generating her preferences with
respect to all the men who have not proposed to wi during the execution of Algorithm 1.
Definition 5. Let t ∈ [1,N ] , let ∆ ≥ 0 be an integer. We denote by (Pt,∆) the property that for
every j ≤ t and i > t + ∆,w j prefersmj tomi . To simplify notations, we also define (Pt ) := (Pt,0).
Notice that (Pt ) holds if and only if t is a separator.
Women
µ⊥
Men
︸                                                                          ︷︷                                                                          ︸
t2+∆<i≤n
︸                                        ︷︷                                        ︸
1≤j≤t2
m1 mt1 mt2 . . . mt2+∆ . . . mn
w1 wt1 wt2
1 t2 t2 + ∆ n
Fig. 3. Graphical representation of the analysis of event (Pt2,∆) when we already know that every woman
wj for j ≤ t1 prefers m j to every man mi with i > t2. One then looks at the preference lists of women
wt1+1,wt1+2, . . . ,wt2 and finds ∆ such that each of those women prefers her husband to all men mi with
i > t2 + ∆.
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During the first iteration, consider the preference list of w1. The minimum value x1 might con-
ceivably have is t0 := 1. Ifm1 isw1’s favorite man, event P1 holds, we have a separator, x1 = 1 = t0
and we are done. Else, let t1 = t0 +∆0 denote the maximum index of the men thatw1 prefers tom1.
Separator x1 can be no smaller than t1. Note that by Lemma 17,
∀k ≥ 0, P[∆0 ≤ k | µ⊥] ≥ exp
(
−
λk+1
(1 − λ)2
)
.
We now reveal the preference lists of w2,w3, . . . ,wt1 . If all of them prefer their respective hus-
bands tomt1+1, . . . ,mN , event Pt1 holds (since by definition of t1, we already know thatw1 prefers
m1 tomt1+1, . . . ,mN ), we have a separator, x1 = t1 and we are done. Else, let t2 = t1 + ∆1 denote
the maximum index of the men that some woman among {w2, . . . ,wt1 } prefers to her husband.
Separator x1 can be no smaller than t2. Note that by Lemma 17 again,
∀k ≥ 0, P[∆1 ≤ k | µ⊥] ≥ exp
(
−
λk+1
(1 − λ)2
)
.
Continuing in this manner, we obtain the following characterization of x1:
x1 = 1 + ∆0 + ∆1 + · · · + ∆s−1 with ∆0,∆1, · · · ,∆s−1 > 0,∆s = 0,
where ti and ∆i are defined inductively: t0 = 1; given ti , ∆i is defined as the minimum such that
property (Pti ,∆i ) holds; and given ti and ∆i , we have ti+1 = ti + ∆i .
Lemma 18. Consider independent random variables (∆˜i )i≥0 with the identical distribution
∀k ≥ 0, P[∆˜i ≤ k] = exp
(
−
λk+1
(1 − λ)2
)
Let
x˜1 = 1 + ∆˜0 + ∆˜1 + · · · + ∆˜s˜−1 with ∆˜0, ∆˜1, · · · , ∆˜s˜−1 > 0, ∆˜s˜ = 0
Then we have stochastic domination2: x˜1  x1.
Proof sketch. Observe that∆i only depends on the preference lists ofwomen {w1+ti−1 , . . . ,wti },
so the ∆i ’s are independent. By Lemma 17, ∆˜i  ∆i . Proceeding inductively, summing independent
random variables up to independent times s and s˜ yields that for all k , P[x˜1 ≥ k] ≥ P[x1 ≥ k | µ⊥],
hence stochastic domination. 
Lemma 19. The radius of convergence of the probability generating function of x˜1 is > 1.
Proof. See appendix C. 
Corollary 20. The second moment of x˜1 is bounded, independently of N . That is, E[x˜
2
1] = O(1).
Proof. Using Lemma 19, the probability generating function of x˜1 is a power series Gx˜1 , and
converges on an open set containing 1, thusGx˜1 can be derived twice. Recall that E[x˜
2
1] = G
′′
x˜1
(1)+
G ′
x˜1
(1). A proof giving explicit bounds on E[x˜21] is also given in Appendix C. 
Corollary 21. The random variable x1 has an exponential tail, independently of N .
∀k ≥ 0, P[x1 ≥ k | µ⊥] = exp(−Ω(k))
2Given to random variables A and B, we note A  B and say that A stochastically dominates B when for all k we have
P[A ≥ k] ≥ P[B ≥ k].
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Proof. We use Lemma 18 for the domination of x1, Lemma 19 for the existence of a constant
1 + ε for which the probability generating function of x˜1 is defined, and Markov’s inequality.
∃ε > 0,∀k ≥ 0, P[x1 ≥ k | µ⊥] ≤ P[x˜1 ≥ k] = P[(1 + ε)
x˜1 ≥ (1 + ε)k ] ≤ (1 + ε)−k · E[(1 + ε)x˜1]

4.3 The expected number of stable pairs is linear
Theorem 22. Assume that the men have arbitrary preferences and the women have i.i.d. geometric
popularity preferences. Then the expected total number of stable pairs is O(N ).
Proof. As mentioned earlier, the number Y of stable pairs is at most the sum of the square of
the size of each block:
Y ≤
b∑
i=1
(xi − xi−1)
2
.
Note that the total number b of blocks is at most N .
Observe that separator xi is defined before the full preference lists of women w j for j > xi are
generated. Since the men mj for j > xi are rejected by all women {w1, . . . ,wxi }, they might as
well drop those women from their preference lists. Thus, given the first separator, the remaining
problem is the same as the original problem, except that the number of participants is now 2(N−x1)
instead of 2N . Thus the stochastic domination proved for the first block also holds for the second
block, third block, etc.: with the same techniques we define N independent variables y1, . . . ,yN ,
each distributed identically to x˜1. Since (xi − xi−1)  yi for each i , we deduce that
Y  y21 + · · · + y
2
N
Using Corollary 20, the expected value of each y2i is bounded by a constant independent of N .
E[Y | µ⊥] ≤ E
[
N∑
i=1
y2i
]
=
N∑
i=1
E[y2i ] = NE[x˜
2
1] = O(N )
Now recall that all probabilities and expectation written above are conditioned on the value of the
man optimal stable matching µ⊥. To obtain a bound on the unconditional expectation, write the
law of total probability, the constant hidden in the O being independent from the choice of µ⊥. 
4.4 The difference of rank between two stable husbands is constant
Recall that a womanw∗ who has more than one stable husband could falsely report her preference
list to ensure that she will be matched with her best stable partner. One can imagine a situation
wherew∗ has two stable husbands: the man she ranks first and the man she ranks last. In that case,
w∗ has very high incentives not to report her true preferences.
In the previous subsection, we proved that stable pairs can only exist within a block, and that
the expected size of a block is constant. This does not imply that w∗ cannot manipulate. In this
subsection, we prove that in w∗ preference list, the difference of rank between two men from her
block is a constant. Thus, the incentives forw∗ to lie are very limited.
Theorem 23. Assume that the men have arbitrary preferences and the women have i.i.d. geometric
popularity preferences. Then, for every women w∗, the difference of rank between her best and worst
husbands is constant in expectation, and has an exponential tail.
Proof. In subsection 4.2, the separators are constructed in an online manner: we proceed by
order of increasing i and reveal the entire preference list ofwi by generating her preferences with
respect to all the men who have not proposed to wi during the execution of Algorithm 1.
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Let w∗ be a woman and let i such that w∗ = wi . We denote S the state of the algorithm after
having run Algorithm 1, and after having sampled the preference lists of womenw1, . . . ,wi−1.
• Let t ′ and t be the separators which define w∗’s block. Recall that t ′ < i ≤ t . Conditioning
on S , t ′ is a constant and t is a random variable. Let x = t − t ′ be the size ofw∗’s block.
• Let B be the set of men that have not proposed to w∗ yet.
• Let Bhiдh = B ∩ {m1, . . . ,mt ′} and Blow = B ∩ {mt ′+1, . . .mN }.
• Let z be the number of men from Bhiдh thatw
∗ ranks after a man from Blow .
• Let δ be the difference in rank betweenw∗’s best and worst partner.
Corollary 21 allows us to bound x = t − t ′. We conclude the proof with Lemmas 24 and 25. 
Bhiдh = { }
Blow = { , }
x = |{ , }|
z = |{ }|
{m
1,
.
.
.
,
m
t
′
}
{m
t
′ +
1
,
.
.
.
,
m
t
}
{m
t
+
1,
.
.
.
,
m
N
}
already proposed tow∗
did not proposed tow∗
µ
⊥
(w
∗
)
=
m
∗
µ
⊤
(w
∗
)
B
es
t
m
an
fr
o
m
B
l
o
w
= δ
≤ x + z
Fig. 4. Preference list of w∗. From le to right, men are represented from best to worst. Here x = 6 is the
number of gray shapes; and z = 3 men from Bhiдh are ranked behind a man from Blow .
Lemma 24. Let w∗ be a woman. We define S , x , z and δ as above. Conditioning on S , for every
sampling of the remaining randomness we have: δ ≤ x + z.
Proof. Letm∗ be w∗’s worst stable husband (m∗ = µ⊥(w
∗)). Observe that w∗ ranks every man
who already proposed to w∗ (during Algorithm 1) afterm∗; those men are represented by squares
in Figure 4. Moreover, by definition of blocks,w∗ ranks men {mt+1, . . . ,mN } afterm
∗; those men
are represented by white shapes in Figure 4.
Thus, every man ranked between µ⊤(w
∗) and µ⊥(w
∗) has not proposed to w∗ yet, and is in
or above her block. We bound the number of such men: in her block by x , and above her block
by z. 
Lemma 25. We have E[z] = O(1) and z has an exponential tail.
Proof. Consider N objects {o1, . . . oN }. For all 1 ≤ i < N , item oi has a popularity of λ
i ; and
item oN has a popularity of λ
N /(1 − λ). We use the popularities to build a preference list over the
objects, and we write 1 ≤ r ≤ N the rank of object oN . Let z˜ = N − r . We are going to prove that:
• Conditioning on S , we have z˜  z.
• We have E[z˜] = O(1) and z˜ has an exponential tail.
To prove the stochastic domination, observe that because no man from B proposed tow∗ yet, their
ordering in w∗’s preference list is independent from S . To compute z, we sample men from B up
until a man from Blow is sampled, then we count the number of men from Bhiдh that have not
been sampled. In this process, notice that we replace all men from Blow by one virtual man whose
popularity is equal to the sum of their popularities. Thus z is equal to |Bhiдh | + 1 minus the rank
of this virtual man. Without loss of generality, we can multiply every popularity by λN−1−t
′
. Now,
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the popularities of men from Bhiдh are a subset of {λ
1
, . . . , λN−1}. The sum of popularities of men
from Blow is at most λ
N /(1 − λ). Thus, by construction z˜  z.
Now let us bound z˜. For all 1 ≤ i < N , we have oN ≻ oi with probability:
λN /(1 − λ)
λi + λN /(1 − λ)
=
λN−i
1 − λ + λN−i
<
λN−i
1 − λ
Therefore, by linearity of the expectation:
E[z˜] =
N−1∑
i=1
P[oN ≻ oi ] <
N−1∑
i=1
λN−i
1 − λ
<
λ
(1 − λ)2
= O(1)
Moreover, for all k ≥ 1, if z˜ ≥ k then there is at least an object oi with i ∈ {1, . . . ,N −k} such that
oN ≻ oi . Using the union-bound:
∀k ≥ 1, P[z˜ ≥ k] ≤
N−k∑
i=1
P[oN ≻ oi ] <
λk
(1 − λ)2
= exp(−Ω(k))

4.5 Weakly geometric popularities
All the analysis of this section also goes through when women have independent (but not nec-
essarily identical) weakly geometric popularity preferences (with two constant parameters A and
B).
Definition 6 (Weakly geometric popularity preferences). We say that a woman w has weakly
geometric popularity preferences if her distribution D satisfies that:
• there is a constant A ≥ 1 such that for all i, j with j > i +A, we have D(mj ) ≤
1
2D(mi ).
• there is a constant B ≥ 1 such that for all i, j with j > i , we have D(mj ) ≤ B · D(mi ).
5 UNIFORMLY RANDOM PROPOSALS: PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In section 4, we studied the case where men have geometric popularities that are used to construct
the women’s preference lists. We showed that if we know the men-optimal stable matching µ⊥,
thenwe can order thewomen (womanwi beingmarriedwithmi in µ⊥) and decompose the instance
into blocks, so that each person has all of their stable partners within their block. Corollary 21
shows that the distribution of the size of a block has an exponential tail.
In this section, we discuss which additional results can be obtained when in addition women
have all equal popularities, that are used to construct the men’s preference lists.
Theorem 3. Assume that the men have uniform popularity preferences and the women have geomet-
ric popularity preferences. Then the expected total number of stable pairs is N + O(ln3 N ). Moreover,
a woman using a non-truthful strategy will not improve the rank of her partner in her true preference
list, with high probability.
To prove the theorem, we will proceed as follows: Sample the preference lists of all the women.
Run Algorithm 1, with men sampling their preferences online. Let µ⊥ be the resulting men-optimal
stable matching and relabel the woman according to µ⊥. Record the list of all proposals made by
the men so far. Use the analysis of section 4 to define blocks.
5.1 Typical instances
We start our analysis by assuming that the instance has nice properties. Then for each woman
w∗ ∈ W, we enumerate all stable husbands of w∗ using Algorithm 2, with men sampling their
preferences online.
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Definition7. LetC = O(1) be a constant to be defined later. LetOK denote the event that all blocks
have size at most C lnN , and every woman prefers manmi to manmj whenever j ≥ i +C lnN .
Proof of Theorem 3. Let Y be the number of stable pairs. By Lemma 26,OK has probability at
least 1 − 1/N 2. When OK does not hold, we use the bound Y ≤ N 2, so we have:
E[Y ] = P[not OK]︸       ︷︷       ︸
≤1/N 2
·E[Y | not OK]︸            ︷︷            ︸
≤N 2
+P[OK]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
·E[Y | OK] ≤ 1 + E[Y | OK]
Using Lemma 28 we write:
E[Y | OK] =
∑
µ matching
P[µ⊥ = µ | OK] · E[Y | µ⊥ = µ and OK] = N + O(ln
3 N ).
Hence Theorem 3. 
Lemma 26. The probability of event OK is ≥ 1 − 1/N 2.
Proof. For the first case of failure, recall from Corollary 21 that the size of a block has an
exponential tail. Thus we can chooseC such that the probability of a given block has a size greater
thanC logN is at most 1/(2N 3). There are at most N blocks, using the union bound the probability
that at least one has a size exceeding C logN is at most 1/(2N 2). For the second case of failure,
notice that the probability for a woman to prefer a manmj to a another manmi isD(mj )/(D(mj )+
D(mi )) ≤ λ
j−i ≤ λC lnN when i +C lnN ≤ j . Thus we can choose C such that the probability of
this happening is smaller than 1/(2N 5). Using the union bound over all triples of woman/mi /mj ,
the probability of a failure is at most 1/(2N 2). Choosing C maximal between the two values, and
using the union bound over the two possible cases of failure, the probability that OK does not
holds is at most 1/N 2. 
5.2 The sequence of proposal in Algorithm 2 has a “no-return” property
Recall that to check that event OK holds, we sampled the preference lists of all women. The only
remaining source of randomness is the remainder of the preference lists of men, each time a man
needs to propose he will sample a woman uniformly from the set of women he has not proposed
to yet.
Lemma 27. Fix i ∈ [1,N ]. Conditioning on µ⊥ and on which proposals have already been made by
the men in Algorithm 1, assumingOK holds, the probability that womanwi has more than one stable
husband is at most 3C lnN /(N +C lnN − i).
Women
Men
mi mk mj
wi wj
. . .
C lnN C lnN C lnN
Fig. 5. Proof of Lemma 27, probability thatwi has several stable husbands ≤ ratio
. . .
. . . + . . .
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Proof. We run Algorithm 2 withw∗ := wi , so manmi is the initial proposer. Say that a woman
w j is “red” if j ≤ i −C lnN , “yellow” if i −C lnN < j ≤ i + 2C lnN , and “green" if i + 2C lnN < j .
Ifmi proposes to a red woman then he is automatically rejected (eventOK ), so consider the first
proposal mi does to a yellow or green woman. Let B be the number of yellow women to whom
mi has not proposed yet, andG be the number of green women. Manmi has not proposed to any
green woman (event OK ).
If this proposal is made to a green woman, then she accepts (event OK ). We claim that in that
casemi is the unique stable husband ofwi . To see that, let us first prove by induction on time from
that point on during the rest of the execution of Algorithm 2 the following property:
(P): The proposer’s block is no better (in terms of popularity) than w j ’s block.
• Initially the proposer ismj , and he is in w j ’s block, so (P) holds.
• Inductively assume that (P) holds for the current proposer, a manmk . The block of w j has
size at most C lnN (event OK ), thus k > j −C lnN > i +C lnN . Ifmk proposes to w j , he is
rejected becausew j is currently married tomi (event OK ). Ifmk proposes to a woman in a
better block than his, he is rejected by definition of blocks. Thusmk can only be accepted
by a woman currently married to a man whose block is not better than the block ofw j , and
so property (P) also holds for the next proposer.
Thus (P) holds throughout the remainder of the execution, so the current proposer is always in a
block worse than the block ofw∗, and so will never get accepted by womanw∗; thereforew∗ only
has one stable husband, as claimed.
Thus the probability that womanwi has more than one stable husband is at most the probability
thatmi ’s first proposal to a yellow or greenwoman is addressed to a yellowwoman. By the uniform
assumption, that probability is B/(B + G). Since B ≤ 3C lnN and G ≥ N − i − 2C lnN we have:
Pr(wi has more than one stable husband) ≤
B
B +G
≤
3C lnN
3C lnN +G
≤
3C lnN
N +C lnN − i
. 
Lemma 28. Conditioning on µ⊥ and which proposals have already been made in Algorithm 1, as-
suming that event OK holds, the expected number of stable pairs is N + O(ln3 N ).
Proof. We proved in Lemma 27 that the probability that a womanwi has more than one stable
husband is at most 3C lnN /(N +C lnN − i). Thus, the expected number of woman with more than
one stable husband is bounded by
N∑
i=1
3C lnN
N +C lnN − i
=
N−1∑
i=0
3C lnN
i +C lnN
≤ 3C lnN
∫ C logN−1+N
C logN−1
dt
t
= 3C lnN ln
(
C logN − 1 + N
C logN − 1
)
When N is large enough, we can simplify this bound to 3C ln2 N . As event OK holds, we can say
that each of those women has at most C lnN stable husbands. Conditioning on the value of µ⊥,
the expected number of stable pairs when event OK holds is at most N + 3C2 ln3 N . 
5.3 Bounded popularity preferences
All the analysis of this section also goes through when women have independent (but not nec-
essarily identical) weakly geometric popularity preferences (see Definition 6) and men have inde-
pendent (but not necessarily identical) bounded popularity preferences (with a constant parameter
A).
Definition 8 (Bounded popularity preferences). We say that a man m has bounded popularity
preferences (with parameter A ≥ 1) if in his distribution D over the women, the ratio between the
maximum and minimum popularities is at most A.
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A BACKGROUND (DETAILS)
Let us give a detailed execution of Algorithms 1 and 2 on the following instance.
m1 : w1 ≻m1 w2 ≻m1 w3 w1 :m2 ≻w1 m1 ≻w1 m3
m2 : w2 ≻m2 w3 ≻m2 w1 w2 :m3 ≻w2 m1 ≻w2 m2
m3 : w3 ≻m3 w2 ≻m3 w1 w3 :m1 ≻w3 m3 ≻w3 m2
For this instance, there are 3 stable matchings. The stable graph has 7 edges.
µ⊥ = {(m1,w1), (m2,w2), (m3,w3)}
{(m1,w2), (m2,w1), (m3,w3)}
µ⊤ = {(m1,w3), (m2,w1), (m3,w2)}
m1 m2 m3
w1 w2 w3
When running Algorithm 1,m1 proposes tow1 and she accepts,m2 proposes tow2 and she accepts,
m3 proposes to w3 and she accepts. Starting from the matching µ⊥, let us run Algorithm 2 to
enumerate the stable husbands ofw1,w2 andw3.
Stable husbands ofw1
Proposition Answer
m1 → w2 yes
m2 → w3 no
m2 → w1 yes
m2 → ∅
Stable husbands of w2
Proposition Answer
m2 → w3 no
m2 → w1 yes
m1 → w2 yes
m1 → w3 yes
m3 → w2 yes
m3 → w1 no
m3 → ∅
Stable husbands ofw3
Proposition Answer
m3 → w2 yes
m2 → w3 no
m2 → w1 yes
m1 → w2 no
m1 → w3 yes
m1 → ∅
Note that when enumerating the stable husbands ofw3 we did not enumerate the stable husbands
of the other women. For example, w2 rejected the proposition fromm1 because she already had a
proposition fromm3. Algorithm 2 has been introduced in [19]. It is a simplification of an algorithm
that enumerates all stable husbands at the same time [11, 22].
In literature, Algorithm 2 is often described using a “break-marriage” operation. If we want to
compute all stable husbands of a woman w∗, first we compute the stable matching µ⊥ using the
men-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, finding her first husband. Then we declare this
pair unacceptable, and continue the deferred acceptance algorithm until a new stable matching is
found. We repeat this process, an “outer” loop regularly breaking the marriage of w∗, in order to
find all her possible stable partners.
One can notice that after a new stable husband is found, he will be the next person to propose,
as the next step is to breakw∗’s marriage. Thus we decided to merge the “outer” and “inner” loops.
This choice has two effects. First it might possible that this version is a bit harder to apprehend (if
one wants to prove that Algorithm 2 effectively outputs the set of all stable husbands). However
the resulting procedure is much easier to explain, and the transition from the algorithm to the
proofs (see for example Lemma 10) is genuinely more natural.
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B DEFERRED ACCEPTANCE (PROOFS)
Lemma 11. Let µ⊥ denote the matching obtained at the end of Algorithm 1 and µ⊤(w
∗) denote the
last man accepted by w∗ during the execution of Algorithm 2 (her favorite stable husband). Let K be
the number of proposals received byw∗ in Algorithm 2. Then:
E[Nb of stable husbands ofw∗ | µ⊥] ≤ 1+E[ln(K+1) | µ⊥]+E [ln(D(µ⊤(w
∗))) | µ⊥]− ln(D(µ⊥(w
∗)))
Proof. In this proof we use notations from Lemma 10. Let x0 = µ⊥(w
∗), and let x1, . . . , xK be the
sequence of proposals received by w∗ during Algorithm 2. Let p⊥ denote the sum of popularities
of proposals received byw∗ during Algorithm 1 (including x0) and let pi = D(xi ) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ K .
We note Yw ∗ the number of stable husbands ofw
∗, and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ K we noteXi the 0/1 random
variable equal to 1 when “proposal xi is accepted by w
∗”. We know that Yw ∗ = 1 + X1 + · · · + XK .
We use the linearity of expectation, and compute the expected value of each Bernoulli trial.
E[Yw ∗ | µ⊥] = 1 +
K∑
i=1
E[Xi | µ⊥] = 1 +
K∑
i=1
P[Xi = 1 | µ⊥] = 1 +
K∑
i=1
pi
p⊥ + p1 + · · · + pi
Then, we compare the sum to an integral.
K∑
i=1
pi
p⊥ + p1 + · · · + pi
≤
K∑
i=1
∫ p⊥+p1+· · ·+pi
p⊥+p1+· · ·+pi−1
dt
t
= ln(p⊥ + p1 + · · · + pK ) − lnp⊥
Still conditioning on µ⊥, man µ⊤(w
∗) is the overall best proposition received by w∗. It is x0 with
probability proportional to p⊥ and it is xi (1 ≤ i ≤ K ) with probability proportional to pi .
E[ln(D(µ⊤(w
∗))) | µ⊥] =
p⊥ lnp0 + p1 lnp1 + · · · + pK lnpK
p⊥ + p1 + · · · + pK
=
p⊥ lnp⊥ + p1 lnp1 + · · · + pK lnpK
p⊥ + p1 + · · · + pK︸                                        ︷︷                                        ︸
S
+
p⊥ lnp0 − p⊥ lnp⊥
p⊥ + p1 + · · · + pK
Using the convexity of t 7→ t ln t and Jensen’s inequality, we give a lower-bound on S .
S =
K + 1
p⊥ + p1 + · · · + pK
·
p⊥ lnp⊥ + p1 lnp1 + · · · + pK lnpK
K + 1
S ≥
K + 1
p⊥ + p1 + · · · + pK
·
(p⊥ + p1 + · · · + pK
K + 1
)
ln
(p⊥ + p1 + · · · + pK
K + 1
)
S ≥ ln(p⊥ + p1 + · · · + pK ) − ln(K + 1)
Gathering all four equations, we obtain
E[Yw ∗ | µ⊥] ≤ 1 + ln(p⊥ + p1 + · · · + pK ) − lnp⊥
E[Yw ∗ | µ⊥] ≤ 1 + ln(K + 1) + S − lnp⊥
E[Yw ∗ | µ⊥] ≤ 1 + ln(K + 1) + E[ln(D(µ⊤(w
∗))) | µ⊥] −
p⊥ lnp0 − p⊥ lnp⊥
p⊥ + p1 + · · · + pK
− lnp⊥
Finally, using the fact that p0 ≤ p⊥, we can bound the last term.
p⊥ lnp0 − p⊥ lnp⊥
p⊥ + p1 + · · · + pK
+ lnp⊥ =
(p⊥) lnp0 + (p1 + · · · + pK ) lnp⊥
(p⊥) + (p1 + · · · + pK )
≥ lnp0 = ln(D(µ⊥(w
∗)))
Combining the last two inequalities concludes the proof. 
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C INSTANCE DECOMPOSITION (PROOFS)
Before proving Lemma 19, let us start with a direct proof giving explicit bounds on E[x˜21].
Corollary 20. The second moment of x˜1 is bounded, independently of N . That is, E[x˜
2
1] = O(1).
Proof. By definition, ∆˜0, . . . , ∆˜s˜−1 are i.i.d., thus
E[(x˜1 − 1)
2] =
+∞∑
k=0
P[s˜ = k] · E
[(∑k−1
i=0 ∆˜i
)2  ∀i ∈ [0,k − 1], ∆˜i > 0
]
=
+∞∑
k=0
P[s˜ = k] ·
(
k(k − 1) · E[∆˜0 | ∆˜0 > 0]
2
+ k · E[∆˜20 | ∆˜0 > 0]
)
We compute the expected value of ∆˜0 and ∆˜
2
0 conditioning on the fact that ∆˜0 > 0.
E[∆˜0 | ∆˜0 > 0] =
E[∆˜0]
P[∆˜0 > 0]
and E[∆˜20 | ∆˜0 > 0] =
E[∆˜20]
P[∆˜0 > 0]
The random variable s˜ follows a geometric distribution of success parameter P[∆˜0 = 0].
∀k ≥ 0, P[s˜ = k] = P[∆˜0 = 0] · P[∆˜0 > 0]
k
Using those values in the expression of E[(x˜1 − 1)
2], we obtain
E[(x˜1 − 1)
2] =
+∞∑
k=0
P[∆˜0 = 0] · P[∆˜0 > 0]
k
(
k(k − 1) · E[∆˜0]
2
P[∆˜0 > 0]2
+
k · E[∆˜20]
P[∆˜0 > 0]
)
Splitting the sum in two, and starting respectively at k = 2 and k = 1
E[(x˜1−1)
2] = E[∆˜0]
2·P[∆˜0 = 0]·
+∞∑
k=0
(k + 2)(k + 1) · P[∆˜0 > 0]
k
︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
= 2/P[∆˜0=0]3
+E[∆˜20]·P[∆˜0 = 0]·
+∞∑
k=0
(k + 1) · P[∆˜0 > 0]
k
︸                        ︷︷                        ︸
= 1/P[∆˜0=0]2
Finally we obtain a formula similar to Wald’s equation.
E[(x˜1 − 1)
2] =
2E[∆˜0]
2
P[∆˜0 = 0]2
+
E[∆˜20]
P[∆˜0 = 0]
and E[x˜1] =
E[∆˜0]
P[∆˜0 = 0]
From the definition of ∆˜0, for all k ≥ 0 we have P[∆˜0 ≥ k] = 1 − exp
(
− λ
k
(1−λ)2
)
≤ λ
k
(1−λ)2
.
E[∆˜0] =
+∞∑
k=1
P[∆˜0 ≥ k] ≤
+∞∑
k=1
λk
(1 − λ)2
=
λ
(1 − λ)3
E[∆˜20] =
+∞∑
k=0
k2 · (P[∆˜0 ≥ k]−P[∆˜0 ≥ k +1]) =
+∞∑
k=1
(2k −1) ·P[∆˜0 ≥ k] ≤
+∞∑
k=1
(2k − 1)λk
(1 − λ)2
=
λ + λ2
(1 − λ)4
Using those values in the expression ofE[x˜21] = E[(x˜1−1)
2]+2E[x˜1]−1, we obtainE[x˜
2
1] = O(1). 
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Lemma 19. The radius of convergence of the probability generating function of x˜1 is > 1.
Proof. For any random variable X , we can defineGX (z) = E[z
X ] for all real z such that |z | < 1.
Gx˜1(z) = E[z
x˜1] =
+∞∑
k=0
P[s˜ = k] · E
[
z1+
∑k−1
i=0 ∆˜i
 ∀i ∈ [0,k − 1], ∆˜i > 0]
Using the fact that all ∆˜i ’s are i.i.d. we can simplify the expectation of the product.
Gx˜1(z) = z ·
+∞∑
k=0
P[s˜ = k] · E
[
z∆˜0
 ∆˜0 > 0]k = z ·Gs˜ (E [z∆˜0  ∆˜0 > 0])
The conditional expectation can be expressed as follows.
G
∆˜0
(z) = E
[
z∆˜0
]
= P[∆˜0 > 0] · E
[
z∆˜0
 ∆˜0 > 0] + P[∆˜0 = 0]
E
[
z∆˜0
 ∆˜0 > 0] = G∆˜0(z) − P[∆˜0 = 0]
P[∆0 > 0]
Now let us compute the generating function of s˜
Gs˜ (z) = E[z
s˜ ] =
+∞∑
k=0
zk · P[s˜ = k] =
+∞∑
k=0
zk · P[∆˜0 > 0]
k · P[∆˜0 = 0] =
P[∆˜0 = 0]
1 − z · P[∆˜0 > 0]
Combining the three previous equations we obtain
Gx˜1(z) =
z · P[∆˜0 = 0]
1 + P[∆˜0 = 0] −G∆˜0(z)
Formally, we can compute the generating function of ∆˜0 with an Abel transform
G
∆˜0
(z) =
+∞∑
k=0
zk · P[∆˜0 = k] =
+∞∑
k=0
zk · (P[∆˜0 > k − 1] − P[∆˜0 > k])
= 1 +
+∞∑
k=0
P[∆˜0 > k] · (z
k+1 − zk ) = 1 + (z − 1)
+∞∑
k=0
zk · P[∆˜0 > k]
To obtain the convergence radius ofG
∆˜0
, we are going to use an the equivalent of P[∆˜0 > k].
P[∆˜0 > k] = 1 − exp
(
−λk+1
(1 − λ)2
)
∼
λk+1
(1 − λ)2
Thus the radius of convergence of G
∆˜0
is 1/λ. In order Gx˜1(z) to be well defined, we need to have
G
∆˜0
(z) < 1+P[∆˜0 = 0]. Being a probability generating function,G∆˜0 is increasing when 0 < z < 1,
and tends to 1 when z → 1. Let us give an upped bound forG
∆˜0
when 1 ≤ z < 1/λ. To do that, we
are using the fact that the equivalence relation above is also an upper-bound.
+∞∑
k=0
zk · P[∆˜0 > k] ≤
+∞∑
k=0
zk ·
λk+1
(1 − λ)2
=
λ
(1 − zλ)(1 − λ)2
Thus a sufficient condition forGx˜1 to be well defined is to have z ≥ 1 and
G
∆˜0
(z) − 1 ≤
(z − 1)λ
(1 − zλ)(1 − λ)2
< P[∆˜0 = 0]
Themiddle is a continuous function on [1, 1/λ), thus there is an ε > 0 such that having 1 ≤ z ≤ 1+ε
is sufficient for the rightmost inequality to hold, and thus forGx˜1(z) to be well defined. 
